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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
An interesting exception to that situation is presented in the recent
case of Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n. of Newark v. Orr.a The bank-
rupt was liable on a bond, secured by a mortgage on property which did
not belong to him. The creditor foreclosed the mortgage, and bid the
property in at a nominal figure. It (the creditor) then filed a claim in
the bankruptcy proceedings for the amount due on the bond, less the
amount of the nominal bid. The referee reduced the claim to the amount
due on the bond, less the actual value of the property, and his action
was sustained by the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling, on the ground that, since the
property did not belong to the bankrupt, the creditor was not a "secured
creditor" within the definition in Section 1 (23), 4 and therefore its rights
were not governed by Section 57(e). 5 Hence, the Court said these
sections did not "forbid the proof of a claim for the principal of the
bond with interest, though the petitioner [creditor] may not collect and
retain dividends which with the sum realized from the foreclosure will
more than make up that amount."
This return to the "chancery" rule again illustrates the Court's long-
maintained preference,6 and serves as fair warning that, hereafter, the
Court will, in all probability, apply that rule, even in bankruptcy cases,
whenever it is not bound by strict statutory language.
D. W. MARKHAM.
Bills and Notes-Adoption of Printed Seal.
A hurrying age has largely cast seals on the scrapheap. In states
where they are not abolished their formality and significance are much
impaired by either statutory or judicial action.1  Yet even in such an
'55 Sup. Ct. 685 (U. S. 1935).
"30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §1(23) (1927).
130 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §93(e) (1927).
'See Clark, mpra note 1.
'In the following states private seals have been abolished: Aaxz. REv. CODE(Struckmeyer, 1928) §3048 (except corporate seals) ; ARK. Co~sT. of 1874, Sched-
ule 1; CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §1932; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932)
§§28-108; IOWA CODE (1931) §9439; IMr. REv. STAT. (1923) c. 16, §106 (except
corporate seals); Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §471; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§6933 (except corporate seals) ; Miss. CODE (1930) §3302 (except corporate seals) ;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §2957 (except corporate seals); MoNT. REv. CoDEs (1921)
§7524; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) c. 76, §256; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) §117-105
(except corporate seals); N. D. CoMp. LAws (1913) §5894; OHIO ANN. ConE
(Throckmorton, 1929) §32; OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) §5037; S. D. Comp. LAWS
(1929) §864; TENN. CODE: (1932) §7828 (except corporate seals) ; TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1935) art. 27 (except corporate seals) ; WASH. REV. STAT. (Rem-
ington, 1933) §10556; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) c. 97, §122 (except corporate seals).
The effect of this legislation has in most instances been to reduce the status of
a sealed instrument to that of a written contract. In some states, however, just
the reverse seems to have happened. In these states statutes provide that the dis-
tinction between sealed and unsealed instruments shall be abolished, but written
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atmosphere the case of Williams v. Turner,2 decided last spring, came
as something of a shock to the bar and has doubtless outlawed, without
warning or opportunity for preventive measures, a considerable amount
of overdue commercial paper heretofore considered enforceable under the
long statute of limitations for sealed instruments. A promissory note,
says the decision, though it bears after the maker's signature the printed
symbol, "(SEAL)", is not legally a sealed instrument unless there is
additional evidence of a specific intention to adopt the printed seal as
the maker's own.3
instruments shall "import a consideration" in the same manner as sealed instru-
ments have formerly done. Aaiz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §3048; Mo. REV.
STAT. (1929) §2958; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) §45-608. In Indiana and Wyoming
"every writing not sealed shall have the same force and effect that it would have
if sealed." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §2-1601; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) c.
97, §123. In South Dakota a written instrument is "presumptive evidence of con-
sideration." S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) §848.
Many of those states which still retain the distinction between sealed and un-
sealed instruments have nevertheless cut down on the common law effect of a seal.
Statutes in these states provide that, in an action on a sealed instrument, the seal
shall be merely presumptive evidence of consideration which may be rebutted.
MicH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §14200 (presumption of consideration arising from the
presence of a seal "may be rebutted in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as if such instrument were not sealed") ; N. J. COMP. STAT. (1911) p. 2240, §66;
N. Y. Civ. Pn.c. AcT §342; OnE. CODE ANN. (1930) §9-704 (seal is "primary"
evidence of consideration) ; Wis. STAT. (1931) c. 328, §27.
In other states a seal is no longer necessary to convey the legal title to land.
ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §6839; CoLO. ANY. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930)
§823; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §56-104; MIcH. ComP. LAws (1929)
§14007; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) §4270; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §541; UTAH
REv. STAT. (1933) tit. 104, c. 48, §4; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 3, §1.
In many of the states still requiring seals for certain instruments, scrolls and
printed insignia are sufficient as seals. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills,
1930) §824; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5615; FA. Comr. GEN. LAWS (1927)
§5704, §5705; GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) §5; ILL. Rsv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 29,
§1; MicH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §13313; N. Y. CON. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 23,
§44; OMa. CODE ANN. (1930) §9-703; UTAHa REv. STAT. (1933) tit. 104, c. 48, §2;
VT. GEN. LAWs (1917) §22; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930)' §5562, §5; W. VA. CODE
(1931) c. 2, art. 2, §6; Wis. STAT. (1931) c. 235, §17.
Even the requirements of official sealing are modified in various ways. See
N. C. CODE (1935) §§3179, 3297, 3949 (8), and §7880 (97), tax law, which recog-
Inizes the -possible use of scrolls for official seals. A seal no longer converts an
otherwise negotiable instrument into a non-negotiable specialty. Pate v. Brown,
85 N. C. 166 (1881); NEGoTIAL INsTRUMENTs LAW §6, par. 4. And generally
is not conclusive evidence of consideration. Citizen's Nat. Bk. v. Curtis, 153 Md.
235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927) ; Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C. 788, 791, 167 S. E. 74, 75
(1932) ; Lentz v. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 207 N. C. 614, 178 S. E. 226 (1935) (1927)
25 MicH. L. REv. 208; cf. Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C. 44, 53-54, 16 S. E. 854,
857 (1893). Whether the rebuttable presumption of consideration from a seal is any
greater a procedural asset than the prima facie case created by the Law Mer-
chant,--see Campbell v. McCormac, 90 N. C. 491 (1884)-and, by Negotiable In-
struments Law §24, may hinge on whether a presumption is treated in the par-
ticular jurisdiction as doing more than to take the case to the jury. See generally
on that McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5
N. C. L. REv. 291; and 5 Wi GmoE, EvImENcE (2d ed. 1923) §§2483-98.
'208 N. C. 202, 179 S. E. 806 (1935).
The finding at trial here was that the maker of the note did not "adopt as his
seal the word '(seal)' unless he did so by writing his name on said line at the
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That evidence might, it seems, be either in the form of a recital in
the body of the instrument,4 or, of some special manifestation by the
maker of an intent to execute a sealed instrument,u-this last, an almost
unheard of circumstance and a possibility, therefore of little practical
significance.
The decision was not demanded by an earlier binding decision in a
case on all fours, for there was no such case; nor by inescapable logic
from a long line of analogous North Carolina cases, for there were no
such cases ;6 nor did it bow to any overwhelming weight of authority
right band end of which is printed '[Seal]'." This is treated on appeal as a finding
that the maker had no intention of executing a sealed instrument, seemingly too
strict an inference. It could mean equally, and probably did mean, that there was
no other evidence of any intention on the matter. Though defendant's plea of the
three-year statute of limitations might be regarded as denying an intent to execute
a sealed instrument, it does not appear that the plea was introduced in evidence for
this purpose. Even if the court did not want to go to the length of the Restatement
of Contracts in creating a conclusive presumption, it could, out of deference to the
widespread use of this form under the supposition that it provided sealed paper,
have recognized the signing as described to create a rebuttable 'presumption of an
intent to adopt the seal, as was done in the case of a paper paster in Hughes v.
Debnam, 53 N. C. 127 (1860), according to the headnote, though the report itself
seems more doubtful. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONMACTS (1932) §98, subsection 1 with
subsection 2.
'It is understood that some lawyers in consequence of this case are changing
their note forms by incorporating a recital of sealing in addition to the printed
seal at the end of the signing line. Yet the case does not say that such a recital
will conclude the matter and there is local authority that the question is one of
actual intention and so a jury question even when there is a recital. Pickens v.
Rymer, 90 N. C. 282 (1884) (2 signers, one seal). Where, as in such a case, the
only evidence of intent is what appears on the instrument, the folly of leaving it
to the variable results of a jury verdict would seem only too evident. Other cases
sound contra, that a recital establishes adoption of the seal and that it is a matter
for judicial determination. Harrell & Co. v. Butler, 92 N. C. 20, 23 (1885);
Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 141, 12 S. E. 902, 904 (1891) sevible; Ben-
bow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 332, 20 S. E. 453, 455 (1894), cited and quoted in
Bailey v. Hassell, 184 N. C. 450, 456, 115 S. E. 166, 170 (1922), although in that
case a jury had found adoption from extrinsic evidence. See also, Jacksonville,
M. P. Ry. v. Hooper, 160 U. S. 514, 16 Sup. Ct. 379, 40 L. ed. 515 (1896), relied
on in the instant case. But those were cases where a seal was necessary to the
validity of the instrument and cannot be definitely relied upon in view of the in-
timation in the instant decision that a different rule may then apply as in Virginia.
Note (1928) 15 VA. L. Rxv. 91, 92. See also dissent of Henderson, C. J., in
Yarborough v. Monday, 13 N. C. 493, 495 (1830), considering the word "In-
denture" in the body of the instrument sufficient evidence of the adoption of a
seal by two signers. The usual recital will, of course, not satisfy the requirements
of the Code for registering deeds. Withrell v. Murphey, 154 N. C. 82, 87, 69
S. E. 748, 751 (1910). In the following cases there was no evidence of any recital:
Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880); Clayton v. Cagle, 97 N. C. 300, 1 S. E.
523 (1887) ; Caldwell v. Morganton Mfg. Co., 121 N. C. 339, 28 S. E. 475 (1897) ;
cf. the now probably obsolete view that the recital cannot prove the seal since the
seal must prove the deed of which the recital is but a part. Ingram v. Hall, 2
N. C. 193, 209 (1795).
Something of that sort might arise by a vote of stockholders, authorizing, for
example, an issue of "bonds." Cf. Bailey v. Hassell, 184 N. C. 450, 455, 115 S. E.
166, 169 (1922).
0 While it has been repeatedly said that the question of adopting a seal is one of
the signer's intent, only one previous case has been found in which the symbol was
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elsewhere, for there was no citation of such overwhelming weight of
authority, nor is there any such.7 And the decision is contrary to the
rule adopted by the American Law Institute8 which customarily follows
a clear weight of authority if there is one.9 So far as the state of the
authorities is concerned it might have gone either way-it was a purely
policy decision. When that is the case, a widespread expression of dis-
satisfaction, such as has been heard in this instance, gives rise to doubts.
If the transition from formal, impressive seals in wax,10 to assorted
scrawls, miniature sun-flowers and other penned symbols and printed
insignia be considered,11 some light will be shed on the reasons which
should underlie a decision on the matter. When any non-descript mark
once came to be relied upon and legally approved as a sufficient seal,'12
at once, (1) a clearly designated seal, and, (2) so situated as to relate clearly to
the signature of the one sought to be charged with adopting it. Devereux v. Mc-
Mahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891). That case came up from a jury ver-
dict but contains a statement that signing before a seal automatically created a
deed (p. 141). It is not an authority for the present case since the present deci-
sion thought it necessary to distinguish it on the ground that the instrument was
there one requiring a seal for validity. Cases where the mark is of uncertain
character or is in an unusual or seemingly unrelated location (see notes 13 and
17, infra), are only remotely analogous and of very little persuasive weight.
7 There is usually said to be a split of authority. See 56 C. J., Seals, §5; 1
DAxmL, NEt;. IxsTR. (7th ed. 1933) 32-33, after first stating the rule as announced
in the instant case; Billig and Wunschel, The Private Seal in West Virginia
(1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 330, 334. Accord with view of principal case, Hughes v.
Spratling, 3 Ala. App. 517, 57 So. 629 (1912) (letters, "L. S.") ; Buckingham v.
Orr, 6 Colo. 587 (1883) ; Caputo v. Di Loreto, 110 Conn. 413, 148 At. 367 (1930)
(emphasizing statute) ; Burkhalter v. Perry & Brown, 127 Ga. 438, 56 S. E. 631
(1907) (same); Manning v. Perkins, 86 Me. 419, 29 At. 1114 (1894) ; In re Pirie,
198 N. Y. 209, 91 N. E. 587 (1910). Contra: Langley v. Owens, 52 Fla. 302, 42
So. 457 (1906) (printed letters "L. S."; presumption of sealing; goes largely on
statute) ; Moats v. Moats, 72 Md. 325, 19 Atl. 965 (1890) ; Line v. Line, 119 Md.
403, 86 Atl. 1032 (1913) ; Osborn v. Kistler, 35 Oh. St. 99 (1878); Loraw v.
Nissley, 156 Pa. 329, 27 Atl. 242 (1893) (strong case) ; McLaughlin v. Braddy,
63 S. C. 433, 41 S. E. 523 (1902). See also Green v. Lake, 2 Mackey 162, 172
(D. C. 1882) (involving Mississippi note) ; Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135 (1884).
81 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §98(1) and illustration; see North Car-
olina annotations, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 67.
' Corbin, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 602,
603, although, of course, some minority views have been stated when they were
thought to represent the clearly superior rule.
10 See Article, Seals (1867) 1 A-A. L. REv. 638.
Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C. 193 (1795) ; Billig and Wunschel, supra note 7.
a It is usually stated that whether a given mark or attachment constitutes a
seal is a question for the court while the question of whether it was put on or was
adopted as such by the signer is a question for the jury. See Yarborough v. Mon-
day, 14 N. C. 420, 421 (1832) ; Baird v. Reynolds, 99 N. C. 469, 6 S. E. 377 (1888).
Since recognition of scrawls and marks for seals, however, [see statutes so pro-
viding, supra note 1; also Henderson, J., in Yarborough v. Monday, 13 N. C. 493,
494 (1830); Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. 192, 15 Atl. 500 (1888) (holding that a
mark 1/8 inch long will serve) ], the first question has practically ceased to exist,-
anything will do if so intended and the sole question then becomes the second, i.e.,
if it was so intended. That is a fact question -but it is by no means in all cases a
proper jury question. The intent may be so clearly manifested on the instrument
that the court should decide it, as where there is a recital of' sealing or, it is be-
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it was proper to seek the actual intent of the signer as to whether he
meant it to be his seal. There was no clearly evident intent from the
mere signing, for the marks might be only flourishes; so likewise when
it was sought to make one seal do for more than one signature.1 3 It is
easy to see why that should be, too. In the one case the kind of mark,
in the other, its place, would suggest a question as to its intended im-
port. But when a printed symbol containing the word "Seal" was used,
the presence of that word in plain English adjacent to each place of
signing would give rise to a natural inference that the self-explanatory
symbol was what it said it was14 and that it was adopted like any other
part of a printed document would be if not cancelled.' 6 In other words,
even though intent is still determinative, it is objective intent, and only
one finding thereon is reasonable under the facts of the instant case-
that the instrument was intended to be sealed. It follows that the trial
judge should direct such a finding or set aside a contrary one as against
the weight of the evidence. Of course, in cases where there is am-
biguity there is a legitimate jury question. This easily distinguishes the
cases relied on by the court, where one scroll was claimed to be the seal
of two,1 6 and where, on a mutilated instrument, the question of the ex-
istence of any marks as a seal was obviously one of fact for the jury.17
A sampling canvass of laymen tends to confirm the view just ex-
pressed. It seems that they quite generally understand that the printed
seal is a part of the instrument, legally efficacious for some purpose and
that it is adopted by signing before it. Of course, it argues nothing for
the opposing position that the signer does not know the full or correct
legal effect of the seal he finds and adopts. That would be still true if
there were a recital. And it is almost as certainly true of the words of
negotiability on the same instrument, yet these, beyond question he
adopts if he does not cancel them. One accepts and incorporates by
signing all plain, seemingly relevant matter connected with the instru-
lieved, likewise where the signature is placed before a mark including the word,
"seal." It would always be open to the defendant to show whether the mark was
wrongfully placed there after the signing. And usual equitable principles should
apply in case of mutual mistake. Cf. Lynam v. Califer, 64 N. C. 572 (1870),
where the seal was added through "mistake and ignorance."
"Yarborough v. Monday, 13 N. C. 493 (1830), 14 N. C. 420 (1832); Pickens
v. Rymer, 90 N. C. 282 (1884).
'" See language of Gilfillan, C. J., in Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135, 137 (1884),
as to presence of word "seal" in brackets as evidencing unmistakable intent to make
the symbol a seal.
I Loraw v. Nissley, 156 Pa. 329, 27 At. 242 (1893), that use of printed form
raises conclusive presumption of the adoption of all parts not cancelled before
signing. And see Oregon statute to the effect that "any -printed seal or scroll on
the instrument at the time of signing will be presumed to have been adopted by
the person signing his name before it." ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §9-703.
Note 13, supra.
11 Baird v. Reynolds, 99 N. C. 469, 6 S. E. 377 (1888).
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ment he signs. This proposition is so elementary that it hardly ever
finds direct expression but it is implicit in such doctrines as the fine
print exception 18 and the significance attached to the writing as evidence
of the parties' intention in the application of the parol evidence rule.'9 ,
And the argument sometimes made that seals might be fraudulently
added 20 loses most of its weight when applied to a printed form, par-
ticularly in view of the present day skill in detecting differences of ink
and type.21
Two considerations, moreover, are present with regard to negotiable
instruments that are not in the case of ordinary common law documents.
The first of these is that commercial paper should not be cluttered up
with unnecessary verbiage such as the non-commercial language of a
recital taken from common law deeds and covenants.22 The second of
these considerations is that a long period of limitation is more justifiable
in the case of negotiable instruments than in the case of most other legal
engagements both written and oral. The universally recognized custom
is to surrender a bill or note when it is discharged 23 and the possibility of
fraudulent suits upon such instruments after the lapse of an unreason-
able time is therefore diminished.
It may be silly to allow an informal mark carelessly annexed or
thoughtlessly adopted, to effect the same important differences in legal
'S 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §112. And see novel argument based on
that doctrine. People v. Mich. Ave. Trust Co., 242 Ill. App. 579, 596-597 (1926).
" That the parol evidence rule prevents "varying, contradicting or adding to" a
writing only when reasonable men would have intended it to embody the final and
complete agreement of the parties, see Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320,
126 Ati. 791 (1924), and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural
Device for Control of the Jury (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 365. Cf. 5 WIGMORE, EV-
MENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2430 that the test of intent is subjective. Of course, the
purport of the writing is cogerit evidence of intent. See 5 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE
(2d ed. 1923) §2430 (3).
In North Carolina, it seems that the rule prevents only contradiction and that
any intent is immaterial. Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in
North Carolina (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 151, 156-167. This view of the parol ev-
idence rule would be an analogy for a holding that an instrument like the one in
the instant case is conclusively presumed to be sealed-that is, even objective intent
is immaterial. 'i i
1 DAN EI, NEG. INSTR. (7th ed. 1933) 32; In re Pirie, 198 N. Y. 209, 214, 91
N. E. 587 (1910). Cf. Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C. 193, 210 (1795).
OSBORN, QUEsTIoNED DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 1929) 481-488.
" It is true that Chief Justice Gibson's "Courier without Luggage," [Overton
v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846)] might in this day be more fittingly compared to
a luggage-laden red-cap. But what stipulations it has been found desirable to add
for business reasons are one thing; what are unnecessarily added by legal com-
pulsion are another. The practice was to cut down on words and utilize implications.
Note the dropping of "for value received"; the absence of recitals about signing
and delivery like those in the language of common law documents, "signed, sealed
and delivered"; the bare form of a blank endorsement with its fully effectual
operation to transfer and bind-all mercantile abbreviations for mercantile paper.
N EGOTIA.BLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §74; N. C. CODE (1935) §3055.
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rights which the old-time elaborate and impressive sealing did.24 Seal-
ing today, even with a preliminary printed recital, is hardly more than
a blind and inadequately comprehended equivalent of declaring con-
sideration to be unnecessary25 and enforceability to be lengthened. Yet
a statement in plain words to the same effect would hardly be permitted
to serve the purpose.26
Perhaps such a statement should be sanctioned and even made the
exclusive way of accomplishing those objects,2 7 or at the opposite ex-
treme that the entire effect of private seals should be done away with
along with the seals themselves.28 The former course would assure a
wider understanding of what was legally accomplished; the latter would
remove the need for any special understanding. But either of these
departures would be recognized as a matter for legislative determination
so that existing rights might be protected.
Williams v. Turner, the instant case, departed from the rule appar-
ently long supposed to be the law in this state and long acted upon as
such. 29 There is nothing unseemly about a court's acquainting itself
with existing lay ideas as to the state of the law and with the practices
built up upon such ideas, and in then considering the consequences to
business and private rights of a decision one way or the other,-espe-
SSee Decker, The Case of the Sealed Instrument in Illinois (1917) 1 ILL. L.
BuLL. 65-66, 173-174; Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal (1915) 15 CoL. L.
REv. 24; Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C. 193, 203. But cf. Reeve, The Unifarm Written
Obligations Act (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 580.
' As to negotiable instruments, this is not included. See citations at the end of
note 1, supra.
'Cf. cases holding recital without seal insufficient. Annotations to REsrAT-
mEzNT, CoNTRAcTs (1932) §96, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 66; Note (1926) 4 N. Y.
L. Rav. 431. But a contrary rule exists by statute in some states. ALA. CODE
(Michie, 1928) §6847; MAss. ANN. LAws (Michie, 1932) c. 4, §9A; N. J. Laws
1931 c. 12 (applies only to conveyances of real property); S. C. CODE (1932)
§8694.
"I Cf. the recital of intent to be bound as a substitute for consideration in acts
adopted in Pennsylvania and Utah. Reeve, The Uniform Written Obligations Act
(1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 580; Note (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rv. 196.
"See statutes, supra note 1; Judge Crane, op. cit. mspra note 24, at 36. But ef.
contra, argument of Prof. Reeve, supra note 24, at 580, 581.
Sample forms of promissory notes used in North Carolina, not collected for
this purpose but already in hand for use as illustrative material in the course in
Bills and Notes in the Law School, show the following classifications: (Total
notes, 11); Forms having neither seal nor recital, 1, (Fidelity Bank, Durham);
having both seal and recital, 2, (First & Citizens Nat. Bk., Smithfield, Bank of
Chapel Hill) ; having seal but no recital (the type here in question), 8, (general
form in use at Asheville, and forms of Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., Greens-
boro, Bank of Wendell, Farmers & Merchants Bank, Wendell, First Nat. Bk.,
Washington, Central Bank and Trust Co., Asheville, N. C. Bank & Trust Co.,
Raleigh, Hood System Industrial Bank of Greenville). Furthermore, as to forms
set out in full in recent reported opinions, besides the one in the instant case, that
quoted in Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. ,417 (1934), has a seal but
no recital and is referred to throughout the opinion as 'the note under seal," while
that found in Hall v. Hood, Comr., 208 N. C. 59, 179 S. E. 27 (1935), shows neither
seal nor recital.
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cially when the law in the particular situation, as here, has not already
been cast in a fixed mould. As early, at least, as the 1700's that course
had the approval by conduct of so eminent a jurist as Lord Mans-
field30 and there have been noteworthy examples ever since. If the
court in the instant case had followed that practice it is believed a
different conclusion would have been reached. At least in the case of
standard forms of negotiable instruments bearing printed seals clearly
described as such at the end of the signing lines, the intent of the signer
thereon ought to be regarded as sufficiently evident to require no jury
finding. Whether a like rule ought to apply to a printed "(L. S.)" in
a like place is somewhat more doubtful because of the element of am-
biguity but it may be noted for what it is worth that a limited inquiry
among intelligent laymen shows a considerable impression that such an
insignia, so placed, means "Legal Seal."31
The General Assembly would be well occupied at its next session in
devoting some time to taking up anew the whole problem of seals and
sealed instruments, including those of corporations, and declaring an
appropriate state policy for the present day.
M. S. B.
Contracts-Exclusive Agency-Requirement as to Definiteness.
In an action for breach of contract plaintiff alleged an offer by
defendant automobile manufacturer to grant plaintiff an exclusive sales
agency if plaintiff succeeded in raising $40,000 additional capital. After
plaintiff had raised the $40,000 by a sale of its stock, defendant refused
to perform. Held, on demurrer, that the agreement was too indefinite
and uncertain to be enforced.'
The increasing prevalence of exclusive sales agencies as a means of
distributing manufactured products creates new problems which test the
usefulness of old common law rules of contract. The familiar formula
that to be enforcible an agreement must be reasonably definite and cer-
tain,2 fails as an instrument of predictability. The types of agreements
which will be given or denied legal effect can be ascertained only by a
close examination of the provisions of agreements involved in the cases
where the formula is applied.3 Parties may enter into an enforcible
o See CAMPBELL, LIVms OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES (1899) 120, note.
"If this notion is widespread enough, it should make no difference that it is
historically erroneous.
:Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
2Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933)
(Amount of goods not specified) ; 1 WILLisToN, CONTRACTS (1920) §37; RESTATE-
WiENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §32.
'Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499 (C. C. A.
7th, 1912) (Model and price of cars not stated in agreement, but locality and time
